Series: The Hague Is Not The Way
Why the ICC’s Warrant Against Dela Rosa Is the Wrong Justice in the Wrong Place
Part 1: The Case, the Court, and the Question Nobody Is Asking |
Part 2: The Legal Maze ✦ |
Part 3: Sovereignty — Why This Is Our Fight, Not The Hague’s |
Part 4: Power, Politics, and the ICC’s Dirty Secret |
Part 5: Who Were the Victims? |
Part 6: The Ethics of Justice |
Part 7: The Theological Reckoning
A plain-language guide to the most complicated legal question in Philippine jurisprudence right now, and why the answer is not as clear as either side wants you to believe.
There is a question sitting at the center of the Dela Rosa ICC case that almost nobody in the Philippine media is actually asking. Not whether the alleged killings were wrong. Not whether Bato Dela Rosa deserves to be investigated. Not even whether he is guilty. The question is much more specific and much more technical than any of that.
The question is: Does the ICC actually have the legal authority to issue this warrant?
You might assume that is settled. After all, two ICC chambers both said yes. But here is what you probably did not hear: the jurisdiction question was contested inside the ICC itself from as early as 2023, when the Appeals Chamber split 3–2 in allowing the Philippines investigation to resume. Two judges, Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut and Judge Gocha Lordkipanidze argued that the ICC may no longer have had authority because the Philippines had already withdrawn before the Prosecutor formally sought authorization to investigate (ICC, 2023). Then in 2026, when the full Duterte jurisdictional appeal was decided, Judge Lordkipanidze dissented again — 4–1 (ICC, 2026b; ICC, 2026c). His dissent does not read like a losing argument. It reads like a close call that could have gone the other way.
This post unpacks the law. It explains how the ICC’s jurisdiction works, why the Philippines’ withdrawal from the Rome Statute creates a genuine legal puzzle, what the three strongest arguments in Dela Rosa’s specific defense actually are, and why Republic Act 9851, a Philippine law that many people seem to read out of context is the key to understanding the whole picture.
Now, let us start from the beginning.
■ ■ ■
Understanding the Basics · How the ICC Gets Its Power
The Rome Statute: A Treaty That Created a Court
The International Criminal Court was created in 2002 by a treaty called the Rome Statute (1998). Think of it like a contract signed by countries. When a country signs and ratifies the treaty, it agrees to let the ICC investigate and prosecute certain crimes committed on its soil or by its citizens. The Philippines signed in 2011 (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, 2021).
The ICC only handles the gravest crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. It can only step in when a country cannot or will not prosecute its own people, that is called the complementarity principle (Rome Statute, 1998, Art. 17). The ICC is not a replacement for national courts. It is a last resort.
The Rome Statute also has an exit clause. Article 127 lets any country withdraw by giving one year’s written notice. The Philippines did exactly this in March 2018, and the withdrawal took effect on March 17, 2019. The big question: what happens to crimes committed while the Philippines was still a member?
The Timeline Everything Depends On
To understand the legal debate, you need to know the sequence of events. Dates matter enormously here. The entire jurisdictional question turns on exactly when things happened.
| When | What Happened | Why It Matters Legally |
|---|---|---|
| 2011 | Philippines ratifies the Rome Statute (1998) | ICC jurisdiction begins over crimes committed in the Philippines |
| Jul 2016 – Apr 2018 |
Drug war killings occur; Dela Rosa serves as PNP Chief (ICC, 2026a) | Philippines is still a member. Dela Rosa’s alleged operational role as PNP Chief ends April 2018, a legally critical cut-off date |
| Feb 8, 2018 | ICC Prosecutor opens a Preliminary Examination (ICC, 2021a) | The ICC starts looking at the situation but only the Prosecutor’s office is involved; no judges or chambers yet |
| Mar 17, 2018 | Philippines deposits withdrawal notification (Rome Statute, 1998, Art. 127) | One-year countdown to exit begins. Dela Rosa still has one month left as PNP Chief |
| Mar 17, 2019 | Withdrawal takes effect; Philippines ceases to be an ICC State Party (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, 2021) | Philippines is no longer a member. Preliminary Examination is ongoing but no judicial action has been taken |
| May 24, 2021 | OTP files Article 15 request to open a formal investigation, more than two years after withdrawal (ICC, 2021a) | The Prosecutor waited over two years after Philippine exit before asking judges to authorize an investigation |
| Sep 15, 2021 | Pre-Trial Chamber I authorizes the investigation (ICC, 2021a) | First time judges formally engage, more than three years after Dela Rosa left the PNP |
| Jan 26, 2023 | Marcos administration appeals complementarity ruling while still formally resisting ICC (ICC, 2023) | The administration’s ambiguous posture previews the political shift to come |
| Jul 18, 2023 | ICC Appeals Chamber allows investigation to resume (with a vote of 3-2) Two judges dissent: Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut and Judge Gocha Lordkipanidze (ICC, 2023) | First major judicial split on jurisdiction. Two of five Appeals Chamber judges argue the ICC may no longer have authority because the Philippines withdrew before formal investigation was authorized. The jurisdiction question is genuinely contested inside the ICC itself from this point forward |
| Oct 23, 2025 | Pre-Trial Chamber I unanimously upholds ICC jurisdiction in the Duterte case (ICC, 2025a) | First direct jurisdiction ruling in the Duterte case proceedings but earlier judicial dissents (2023) already existed on the same question |
| Nov 6, 2025 | ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I issues warrant of arrest for Dela Rosa, under seal (ICC, 2026a) | More than seven and a half years after Dela Rosa left the PNP. Warrant exists but is kept confidential at this stage |
| Apr 22, 2026 | Appeals Chamber confirms jurisdiction (4-1) Judge Lordkipanidze issues a partly dissenting opinion for the second time (ICC, 2026b; ICC, 2026c) | Not a clean unanimous verdict. The dissent (again Lordkipanidze) raises the same textual concern since 2023: was the Preliminary Examination really enough? |
| May 11, 2026 | Dela Rosa warrant unsealed; NBI attempts arrest at Senate, attempt fails (Al Jazeera, 2026) | Procedural infirmities in the arrest attempt raise additional questions under Article III of the 1987 Constitution and RA 9851 |
| May 13, 2026 | Philippine Supreme Court declines immediate TRO; orders respondents to comment (Philstar Life, 2026) | The constitutional question (Bill of Rights vs. ICC warrant) is now before the Philippine Supreme Court |
Now you can see the full picture. The alleged crimes happened during the Philippine membership period. But Dela Rosa left the PNP in April 2018. The jurisdiction question was already being contested 3–2 inside the ICC in 2023. The formal investigation was authorized in 2021. The warrant was issued under seal in November 2025 and only unsealed in May 2026, more than seven and a half years after his last alleged operational act.
■ ■ ■
Article 127: The Exit Clause and Its Hidden Ambiguity
The Rome Statute’s withdrawal provision is Article 127. It has two parts that say very different things, and the entire legal battle comes down to the tension between them.
The whole legal fight comes down to four words: “under consideration by the Court.” Was the Preliminary Examination, a process entirely internal to the Prosecutor’s office, with no judges involved a matter “under consideration by the Court”? Or does a matter only come before the Court when judges get involved, which first happened in September 2021, two years after the Philippines left?
That is not a political question. It is a textual one. And the votes inside the ICC itself — 3–2 in 2023, 4–1 in 2026 confirm that reasonable legal minds disagree (ICC, 2023; ICC, 2026b; ICC, 2026c).
Understanding the Scholarly Argument · The Paper’s Core Legal Challenge
The Narrower Interpretation: A Legitimate and Serious Scholarly Challenge
The paper is careful about how it frames its legal challenge. It does not say the ICC clearly and conclusively lacks jurisdiction. That would be too strong. The strongest and most defensible formulation is this:
“Article 127(2) plausibly imposes temporal and continuity limits on post-withdrawal jurisdictional expansion that the ICC may be interpreting too expansively, and a mere preliminary examination may be insufficient to justify indefinite post-withdrawal prosecution of individuals whose alleged conduct had already concluded before even that examination was announced.”
— Diaz, 2026, Section III-A (core scholarly formulation)
The Legal Principle Behind the Argument: Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
There is a classical principle of legal interpretation at work here, one used in treaty interpretation, statutory construction, and constitutional law the world over. Its Latin name is expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means: the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.
Applied to Article 127(2), the reasoning works like this:
Step-by-Step: How the Narrower Reading Works
| Step | The Legal Reasoning |
|---|---|
| 1. The text preserves specific matters | Article 127(2) specifically preserves “matters already under consideration” — not all matters that could ever be connected to the situation |
| 2. The principle of exclusion applies | That specific preservation implicitly excludes matters not yet under concrete consideration. The expression of one thing excludes the other. |
| 3. A preliminary examination is internal only | A Preliminary Examination is an internal prosecutorial assessment, not subject to judicial authorization, not involving the Court’s chambers, not reaching specific suspects. It is not yet “before the Court” in any legally cognizable sense (Schabas, 2016, pp. 434–440; Bassiouni, 2008, pp. 47–52) |
| 4. The consequence is clear | Once withdrawal becomes effective, the Court should not be able to newly initiate or substantially expand jurisdiction over matters that were not yet concretely engaged before withdrawal took effect (Schabas, 2016, pp. 434–440; Bassiouni, 2008, pp. 47–52) |
The Gravest Power a Legal System Possesses
There is a reason criminal courts are held to the strictest standards of interpretive caution: criminal courts exercise the gravest power a legal system possesses, the power to arrest, prosecute, and imprison. This is not just a philosophical point. It is embedded in the Rome Statute itself.
Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute provides that criminal provisions must be strictly construed and that ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the accused. While Article 22(2) speaks directly to criminal definitions, the same caution against expansive interpretation has long influenced how courts approach criminal jurisdiction and penal authority more generally. The principle is: doubtful jurisdiction should not be expanded by implication. Where two interpretations are legally plausible, criminal-law interpretation traditionally favors the narrower construction when liberty and jurisdiction are at stake (Diaz, 2026, Section III-A). Put simply: if two interpretations are legally plausible, criminal law traditionally leans toward the narrower one when liberty and jurisdiction are at stake
This means Judge Lordkipanidze’s dissent matters not merely because it lost 4–1. It matters because it reflects a longstanding legality principle deeply embedded in both domestic and international criminal law, a principle that the majority’s expansive reading arguably strains.
The Risk: A Withdrawal Right That Becomes Functionally Symbolic
If a mere preliminary examination entirely internal to the Prosecutor’s office indefinitely freezes jurisdiction over any person who can later be connected to a situation, then the withdrawal right guaranteed by Article 127(1) risks becoming functionally symbolic. A country could give notice, wait one year, exit formally, and still find itself subject to ICC warrants issued years later against individuals who were never specifically named, charged, or judicially engaged during the membership period. That is a serious jurisprudential concern, regardless of where one stands on ICC legitimacy (Schabas, 2016, p. 430; Bassiouni, 2008, p. 48).
Understanding the Debate · What Each Side Argues
The ICC Majority vs. The Dissenting Judges (2023 and 2026)
The ICC Majority (4 of 5 in 2026; 3 of 5 in 2023)
- A Preliminary Examination is a step in the Court’s process and counts as being “under consideration.”
- “The Court” in Article 127(2) means the institution as a whole, including the Prosecutor’s Office (ICC, 2026b).
- Reading it the other way would make Article 127(2) meaningless for early-stage investigations.
- Article 12(2) must be read together with Article 127(2) as lex specialis, not as a self-sufficient bar.
The Dissenting Judges (Lordkipanidze in 2026; Lordkipanidze & Perrin de Brichambaut in 2023)
- A Preliminary Examination is entirely inside the Prosecutor’s office. No judge has been involved. That is not “the Court” (ICC, 2026c).
- “The Court” in legal usage means the judicial body, chambers and judges, not the prosecution.
- A matter only comes before the Court when a Pre-Trial Chamber authorizes an investigation under Article 15(4). That happened in September 2021, two years after withdrawal. As Lordkipanidze wrote directly: “A preliminary examination is not a matter under consideration by the Court within the meaning of Article 127(2) of the Statute, and a situation is only under consideration by the Court once a pre-trial chamber authorizes an investigation into that situation” (ICC, 2026c).
- Article 127(1) already gives the fair solution: the Prosecutor had one year from the withdrawal notice to seek authorization. The OTP chose not to use that window. The Burundi precedent where judicial authorization was secured before withdrawal was the correct model (ICC, 2026c; Karnavas, 2025).
International criminal defense practitioner Michael G. Karnavas, licensed before the ICC and based in The Hague, reached the same conclusion as the dissenting judges independently: by failing to act within the one-year window, the OTP forfeited the jurisdictional connection (Karnavas, 2025). Scholarly corroboration appears in the LSE Law Review (2025) and the Asian Journal of International Law (2025). Professor Raphael A. Pangalangan of the University of the Philippines earlier identified the temporal jurisdiction question as “the elephant in the courtroom” (Pangalangan, 2023). The full scholarly argument behind the narrower interpretation, including the expressio unius principle and the gravest-power doctrine is set out in the purple box above.
Three Arguments That Apply to Dela Rosa Specifically
On top of the general jurisdictional debate, the paper identifies three arguments that apply specifically to Dela Rosa distinct from the Duterte case and deserving their own analysis (Diaz, 2026, Section III-A1). These are not claims that the ICC conclusively lacks jurisdiction. They are serious treaty-interpretation and institutional-legitimacy challenges properly framed as exactly that.
■ ■ ■
Republic Act 9851: The Most Misread Law in This Debate
Republic Act 9851 is not being ignored in the Philippines. It is being discussed constantly but it is frequently read in isolation, disconnected from the 1987 Constitution, the Rome Statute’s complementarity framework, and the full body of Philippine criminal law. Read holistically, in proper constitutional and treaty context, it tells a very different story from what many commentators claim.
Understanding the Law in Context
Republic Act No. 9851 (2009) — The Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity
In 2009, the Philippines passed its own domestic law that defines and criminalizes the same offenses covered by the Rome Statute (crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes etc.) This law exists independently of the ICC. It does not require the Philippines to be an ICC member. It is a Philippine law enforceable by Philippine courts.
Section 17 authorizes Philippine authorities to surrender an accused person to the appropriate international court but the critical word is “may,” not “shall.” The statute grants discretion, not a mandatory directive (RA 9851, 2009, Sec. 17).
Section 18 vests original and exclusive jurisdiction in Philippine Regional Trial Courts over crimes against humanity committed in the Philippines (RA 9851, 2009, Sec. 18). This is an affirmative statement that the Philippine justice system claims primary jurisdiction over these alleged crimes.
Pangilinan v. Cayetano (2021) recognized that RA 9851 provides the Philippines with a domestic statutory framework for prosecuting crimes against humanity independently of the ICC. The Philippines did not need continued ICC membership in order to possess domestic legal mechanisms capable of prosecuting these crimes.
The paper argues that RA 9851 strengthens the complementarity case for domestic prosecution because it demonstrates that the Philippines possesses an existing legal framework capable of prosecuting crimes against humanity through its own courts. RA 9851 is a gateway to Philippine justice, not an automatic green light for The Hague (Diaz, 2026, Section III-B; Santos, 2025; Borjal, 2025).
One important nuance: The ICC majority argues that the mere existence of RA 9851 is insufficient if domestic institutions are unwilling genuinely to prosecute. The paper contests this conclusion by arguing that political obstruction under one administration does not equal permanent institutional incapacity, and that the constitutional and statutory tools for domestic accountability have always been available and must now be used (Diaz, 2026, Section IV-B).
The Bill of Rights Problem — and What the May 11 Arrest Got Wrong
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution requires a warrant issued by a Philippine judge for any arrest on Philippine soil. The paper argues that the stronger constitutional reading is that “judge” in this provision means a Philippine judge operating within the Philippine judicial system because the Bill of Rights is embedded within the constitutional order the Filipino people themselves created, a judicial order that does not recognize foreign tribunals as organs capable of directly exercising coercive authority over Filipino citizens within Philippine territory (1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1; Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 1991; Soliven v. Makasiar, 1988). The Philippine Supreme Court has not yet finally resolved this specific ICC-warrant question, but the five-ground constitutional analysis in the paper strongly supports this reading (Diaz, 2026, Section III-E).
| The Argument | The Counter-Argument | The Paper’s Assessment |
|---|---|---|
| Bill of Rights: Article III, Sec. 2 requires a Philippine judge-issued warrant. A foreign-issued ICC warrant bypasses the constitutional judicial structure entirely. | ICC/Government: Article II, Sec. 2 incorporates international law into domestic law. RA 9851, Section 10 provides a post-arrest Philippine judicial check. Due process is satisfied by fair procedure, not necessarily Philippine procedure. | The paper argues the stronger constitutional reading is that “judge” means a Philippine judge within the Philippine judicial system. Philippine doctrine already requires recognition proceedings for even final civil foreign judgments, with greater reason, a foreign arrest warrant directly affecting Filipino liberty should require prior Philippine judicial confirmation (Mijares v. Ranada, 2005; Rules of Court, Rule 39, Sec. 48). The Supreme Court has not yet finally resolved this specific question. |
| Senate immunity: Article VI, Sec. 11 provides senators with parliamentary privilege; the arrest attempt during session is a violation. | ICC/Government: Congressional immunity applies to Philippine proceedings only. International criminal law is not bound by domestic parliamentary privilege. | The weaker of the defense arguments. International criminal law consistently holds that domestic immunity provisions do not bind international tribunals. The Senate’s declaration of “protective custody” has no legal standing in ICC law. |
The May 11, 2026 arrest attempt was also procedurally infirm on a separate ground. Article 59 of the Rome Statute (1998), incorporated through RA 9851, Section 10, requires that upon arrest the accused be brought promptly before a competent judicial authority of the custodial state. The constitutionally sound procedure, had enforcement proceeded, would have been: presentment of the ICC warrant to a Philippine Regional Trial Court for a confirmation order first, then arrest pursuant to that order. The executive skipped the Philippine judicial step that both the Constitution and the Rome Statute itself require (Diaz, 2026, Section III-G; Al Jazeera, 2026).
This procedural problem was not an isolated oversight. It reflected a broader pattern: the jurisdiction question had been contested 3–2 inside the ICC since 2023, and yet enforcement proceeded as though the legal foundation were unassailable.
■ ■ ■
One More Thing the Paper Insists On: Presumption of Innocence
Analyzing the ICC’s jurisdiction is not the same as saying Dela Rosa is innocent. The paper is unequivocal: Bato Dela Rosa is presumed innocent of all charges until proven guilty before a competent court. Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides this guarantee, and it is not a procedural nicety. It is a constitutional commitment that no person, however credibly accused, shall be treated as guilty before a competent court has so found after due process (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14[2]).
The paper applies this in both directions through the regularity principle: public officers are presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular and lawful manner until the contrary is proven by competent evidence before a competent tribunal (People v. Marcelino, 2010). This does not foreclose prosecution. It forecloses premature condemnation.
“The presumption of innocence and the presumption of regularity apply equally to accused persons and to the officials who issued orders. Both presumptions are rebuttable by evidence. Neither is a shield from accountability. Both are requirements of justice.”
— Diaz, 2026, Section III-C
■ ■ ■
The Legal Lens: Where Does the Argument Land?
After examining all the legal arguments, here is how the scholarly paper scores the key questions through the legal lens alone (Diaz, 2026, Section XII):
| Legal Question | ICC’s Position | Defense’s Position | Paper’s Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the ICC have jurisdiction generally? | YES | NO | Majority upheld, but genuinely close: 3–2 in 2023, 4–1 in 2026 |
| Did the Preliminary Exam count as being “before the Court”? | YES | NO | The dissenting judges’ reading is arguably more textually sound; multiple ICC judges have agreed |
| Is Dela Rosa’s warrant legally different from Duterte’s? | NO | YES | Yes, three Dela Rosa-specific arguments make his case legally more contested than Duterte’s |
| Does RA 9851 point to domestic prosecution or authorize ICC surrender? | AUTHORIZES | DOMESTIC FIRST | RA 9851 strengthens the domestic prosecution case; Section 17 is permissive, not mandatory; Section 18 gives Philippine RTCs primary jurisdiction |
| Does the Bill of Rights require prior Philippine judicial confirmation? | NO | YES | Paper argues the stronger constitutional reading requires prior Philippine judicial confirmation. Supreme Court has not yet finally ruled on the specific ICC-warrant question |
■ ■ ■
Coming Up Next
Part 3: Sovereignty — Why This Is Our Fight, Not The Hague’s
The law says one thing. But what does the Philippine Constitution say about sovereignty? Part 3 moves from treaty text to Articles II and VII of the 1987 Constitution, and asks whether the Marcos administration, by cooperating with the ICC, is actually betraying the very sovereignty protections it claims to be defending. We also examine Krasner’s “organized hypocrisy” — the theory that explains why powerful countries never submit to the ICC while insisting smaller nations must.
Subscribe below to be notified when Part 3 is published.
Theological Meta-Framework
What does Scripture say about law, power, and the right forum for justice?
The scholarly paper that underlies this series operates within a theological meta-framework, meaning Scripture and Christian theology are not footnotes but the integrating architecture for all nine lenses of analysis. On the legal questions in this post, the framework draws on Romans 13:1–7, which speaks of governing authorities established by God as servants of justice within their proper domain (Moo, 1996; Calvin, 1960, Book IV, Chapter 20).
The theological reading does not stop at “obey the government.” It asks: which government? When a sovereign people, the Filipino people, have constituted their own courts, established their own laws (including RA 9851), and created their own institutions of accountability, the theological question is whether it honors God’s design for justice to hand that responsibility to an external court whose legitimacy is contested, whose process excludes the victims’ communities from meaningful participation, and whose enforcement depends entirely on the political calculations of an administration that is itself accused of using the ICC for dynastic warfare (Diaz, 2026, Theological Meta-Framework).
The full theological analysis is in Part 7. But the foundation is laid here: genuine accountability before God requires genuine due process, and due process means the right court, with the right jurisdiction, at the right time. The imago Dei in every person demands nothing less, not for the alleged victims, and not for the accused (Wenham, 1987; Bavinck, 2004).
For Scholars and Deeper Readers
Download the Full Scholarly Paper
The Hague Is Not The Way: Why the ICC’s Warrant Against Dela Rosa Is the Wrong Justice in the Wrong Place. A Comprehensive Multidisciplinary, Cross-Disciplinary, Interdisciplinary and Normative Transdisciplinary Scholarly Paper
This blog series is the accessible, plain-language version of the full scholarly paper. The full paper includes complete analysis, the nine full disciplinary analyses, the complete theological meta-framework with full scriptural exegesis, Philippine law and case law citations, and complete references.
⇓ Download the Full Paper (PDF)
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References
Al Jazeera. (2026, May 11). Philippine senator flees ICC arrest over role in Duterte’s drug war. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2026/5/11/philippine-senator-flees-icc-arrest-over-role-in-dutertes-drug-war
Asian Journal of International Law. (2025, August). An evaluation of the legacy jurisdiction of the ICC: The Philippines investigation. Asian Journal of International Law (Cambridge University Press).
Bassiouni, M. C. (2008). International criminal law: Multilateral and bilateral enforcement measures (3rd ed.). Martinus Nijhoff.
Bavinck, H. (2004). Reformed dogmatics: Vol. 2. God and creation (J. Bolt, Ed.; J. Vriend, Trans.). Baker Academic.
Borjal, R. F. (2025, November 4). Justice, not rendition: Why Duterte’s surrender to the ICC is constitutional. Dateline Ibalon. https://dateline-ibalon.com/2025/11/justice-not-rendition-why-dutertes-surrender-to-the-icc-is-constitutional-raul-f-borjal/
Calvin, J. (1960). Institutes of the Christian religion (Vol. 2, Book IV, Chapter 20) (J. T. McNeill, Ed.; F. L. Battles, Trans.). Westminster Press. (Original work published 1559)
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International Criminal Court. (2026a). Warrant of arrest for Ronald Marapon Dela Rosa, issued under seal November 6, 2025; unsealed May 11, 2026. https://www.icc-cpi.int/philippines
International Criminal Court. (2026b). Judgment of the Appeals Chamber confirming jurisdiction in the Duterte case (4–1 majority), April 22, 2026. https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-appeals-chamber-confirms-jurisdiction-duterte-case
International Criminal Court. (2026c). Lordkipanidze, G. (Partly dissenting opinion). Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, April 22, 2026. ICC Court Records. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/CourtRecords/0902ebd18051fd38.pdf
Karnavas, M. G. (2025, March 31). Does the ICC have jurisdiction over Duterte? No, its jurisdiction has lapsed! michaelgkarnavas.net/Blog. https://michaelgkarnavas.net/blog/2025/03/31/icc-jurisdiction-over-duterte/
LSE Law Review. (2025, May 12). A look at the ICC’s Philippines decision: Is a preliminary examination enough for the court to retain jurisdiction? LSE Law Review. https://blog.lselawreview.com/2025/05/12/a-look-at-the-iccs-philippines-decision-is-a-preliminary-examination-enough-for-the-court-to-retain-jurisdiction/
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Pangalangan, R. A. (2023, September 29). The elephant in the courtroom: ICC temporal jurisdiction over the situation in the Philippines. Just Security. https://www.justsecurity.org/88924/the-elephant-in-the-courtroom-icc-temporal-jurisdiction-over-the-situation-in-the-philippines/
Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875 (Supreme Court of the Philippines, March 16, 2021). https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2021/mar2021/gr_238875_2021.html
People v. Marcelino, G.R. No. 149993 (Supreme Court of the Philippines, July 26, 2010). https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/jul2010/gr_189278_2010.html
People v. Tello, G.R. No. 107285 (Supreme Court of the Philippines, 1999). https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph
Philstar Life. (2026, May 13). SC orders comment on petition filed by Sen. Bato Dela Rosa. Philstar Life. https://philstarlife.com/news-and-views/329077-sc-comment-on-petition-filed-by-sen-bato-dela-rosa
Republic Act No. 9851. (2009, December 11). Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity, Sections 6(c), 7, 10, 17, 18. https://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/Philippines/RA_9851.html
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. (1998). 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. Articles 12, 13, 15, 17, 22, 25, 54, 58, 59, 127. https://www.icc-cpi.int/sites/default/files/2024-05/Rome-Statute-eng.pdf
Rules of Court of the Philippines. Rule 39, Section 48 (Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments).
Santos, S. M., Jr. (2025, November 13). Commentary: RA 9851 needs no IRR. MindaNews. https://mindanews.com/mindaviews/2025/11/commentary-ra-9851-needs-no-irr/
Schabas, W. (2016). The International Criminal Court: A commentary on the Rome Statute (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585 (Supreme Court of the Philippines, November 14, 1988). https://jur.ph/jurisprudence/digest/soliven-v-makasiar
Wenham, G. J. (1987). Genesis 1–15 [Genesis 1:26–27, pp. 27–32]. Word Biblical Commentary. Word Books.
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